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A Trade-off That Becomes a Rip-off: When Schools
Can’t Regulate Cyberbullying
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a place in America where groups of citizens are confined
and allowed few constitutional rights. No citizen may possess a firearm, 1
and carrying any other weapon results in serious penalties. 2 No one is
allowed to freely practice religion,3 nor engage in political protests. 4
Forget freedom of the press; anything the state finds contrary to its
“mission” will be suppressed. 5 “Reasonable” searches, including strip
searches, may be performed without probable cause or a warrant. 6 The
institution governing these citizens can make its own rules and
regulations, 7 and the only due process available for most infractions
consists merely of notice. 8 Even the kinds of clothing allowed are
regulated by the state, 9 and if citizens object, they have little power to
effect a change because most of them cannot even vote. 10

1. 20 U.S.C. § 7151 (2012).
2. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 9.41.280 (2009) (making possession of firearms and
any other weapon at school a gross misdemeanor and grounds for expulsion).
3. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 421 (1962) (prohibiting sponsoring
voluntary daily prayer and Bible reading); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 38 (1985)
(prohibiting voluntary silent prayer).
4. See, e.g., Madrid v. Anthony, 510 F. Supp. 2d 425, 425 (S.D. Tex. 2007)
(prohibiting students attending protest); Walker-Serrano v. Leonard, 168 F. Supp. 2d 332,
332–333 (M.D. Pa. 2001) (upholding prohibition of student circulated petitions). But see
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 503 (1969) (allowing armbands
worn to protest the Vietnam War).
5. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 260 (1988) (upholding
regulation of school newspapers).
6. See Safford Unified Sch. Dist., v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 364 (2009); New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 325 (1985).
7. See, e.g., Price v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., 855 N.Y.S.2d 530, 540 (App. Div. 2008)
(holding rule banning cell phones in schools was not arbitrary and capricious).
8. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 565 (1975) (finding due process afforded for short
term suspensions).
9. Blau ex rel. Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381, 381–82, 385–86
(6th Cir. 2005) (upholding dress code that prohibited baggy or revealing clothing; visible
body piercings; clothing with holes; flip flop sandals or platform shoes; bottoms that are not
solid navy, black, khaki, or white; and tops that are not a solid color, have writing on them or
have logos except the school’s logo that are larger than the size of a quarter).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1 (establishing legal voting age of 18).
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Ironically, most Americans have not only spent at least thirteen
years in such a state-sponsored institution, 11 but have also committed
vast resources to maintain it. 12 Most of these formerly oppressed
citizens not only have fond memories of their time in this
institution 13 but also report high satisfaction 14 in sending their own
children to this seeming “enclave[] of totalitarianism.” 15 This
“totalitarian” institution, almost entirely supported by state and local
taxes, 16 is the U.S. public education system.
The public trades some of its most cherished individual rights to
schools who provide benefits to both the children served and
society, 17 including an environment where schools can inculcate the
“values of citizenship that will enable students to participate
effectively in the nation’s economic practices and democratic
institutions when they become adults.” 18 However, if students trade
some rights, but students’ and parents’ expectations of civility, 19
11. N AT ’L C TR. FOR EDUC. S TATISTICS, PROJECTIONS OF EDUCATIONAL
S TATISTICS
TO
2021
(2013),
available
at
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/projections/projections2021/tables/table_01.asp
(finding
that in 2010, 92% of American children in grades 9-12 were enrolled in a public school).
12. Background Analysis, Federal Education Budget Project, NEW AMERICA FOUND.,
Jun.
30,
2013
[hereinafter
Education
Budget],
available
at
http://febp.newamerica.net/background-analysis/school-finance (“America spends over $500
billion a year on public elementary and secondary education in the United States.”).
13. Jennifer Senior, Why You Truly Never Leave High School, N.Y. MAGAZINE (Jan. 20,
2013), available at http://nymag.com/news/features/high-school-2013-1/ (“[F]or most of
us adults, the adolescent years [in high school] occupy a privileged place in our
memories . . . .”).
14. Jeffrey M. Jones, In U.S., Private Schools Get Top Marks for Educating Children,
GALLUP POLITICS (Aug. 29, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/156974/private-schoolstop-marks-educating-children.aspx (finding that in 2012, 75% of parents reported being
satisfied with the quality of education their oldest child was receiving in public school).
15. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
16. Education Budget, supra note 12 (finding that typically almost 90% of elementary
and secondary education funding is from state and local taxes).
17. Emily Buss, Constitutional Fidelity Through Children’s Rights, 2004 SUP. CT. REV.
355, 361 (2004) (“Schools serve as one of the primary sites for positive influence, for the
development of basic intellectual skills, the acquisition of knowledge, and the cultivation of
prosocial behavior. To accomplish all this, schools need a level of control that may justify a
diminution of rights.”).
18. ANNE PROFFITT DUPRE, SPEAKING UP: THE UNINTENDED COSTS OF FREE SPEECH
IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 9 (2009).
19. Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1057 (2d Cir.
1979) (Newman, J., concurring) (“With its captive audience of children, many of whom, along
with their parents, legitimately expect reasonable regulation, a school need not capitulate to a
student’s preference for vulgar expression.”) (emphasis added).
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order, and security in schools are not realized, they may see this
trade-off as a rip-off. Students and parents who feel cheated by the
schools create significant concerns, including contributing to an
overall lack of faith in the U.S. public education system. 20
One aspect of this trade-off that is a potential rip-off arises in the
arena of cyberbullying. Schools have traditionally required students
to trade some of their First Amendment free speech rights for
protection from the negative effects of other students’ unregulated
speech. Unfortunately, current school speech precedent applied to
cyberbullying often leaves schools unable to discipline cyberbullies.
Accordingly, students and parents can feel ripped-off when, after
surrendering some free speech rights in the name of a safe and
orderly education system, schools are still unable to provide
protection from cyberbullies. This Comment joins other
commentators in arguing that relying on the second prong of the
Tinker test, 21 as has been explored by some lower courts, would
allow schools to consistently discipline harmful student speech no
matter where it originates. Such an application of Tinker allows
schools to uphold their end of the school speech trade-off.
This Comment also breaks new ground arguing that using
Tinker’s second prong is consistent with current school speech
doctrine trade-offs and with Tinker’s history, text, and interpretation
by subsequent Supreme Court cases. Part II explains that the trading
of constitutional rights for benefits is commonplace and beneficial in
schools and society. Part III discusses how one such trade-off—
embodied by the school speech doctrine—has changed over time,
requiring more of students in exchange for the promised benefits of
public schooling. Part IV shows that in spite of this expansion of
restrictions in school speech doctrine, courts currently construe the
doctrine too rigidly in cyberbullying cases, thus creating an unfair
bargain for schools and families. Finally, Part V argues that courts
20. Jones, supra note 14. Although parents are generally satisfied with the quality of
education their own children receive in public school, this satisfaction has declined 5% over the
last two years. Id. Also, Americans in general have an increasing low opinion of public schools.
Id. In 2012, only 37% of Americans believed public school provided a “good” or “excellent”
education, and every year since 2004, less than half of Americans have reported being
“satisfied” with the quality of public education in the United States. Id.
21. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969)
(outlining a two-prong test to determine if a school could regulate student speech: (1) if the
student’s speech substantially disrupts the school, or (2) if the speech invades the rights of
others to be secure and left alone).
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should use Tinker’s second prong to consider the “rights of others”
when determining if a student’s cyberbullying speech is protected.
This approach would ensure that students who shed many of their
rights “at the schoolhouse gate” 22 do not find the school’s promise
of order and security empty.
II. TRADING RIGHTS
Historically, schools were not required to recognize students’
individual rights. 23 Today, public school students do not absolutely
shed their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate; however,
students’ at-school rights are not as extensive as their out-of-school
rights 24 nor “coextensive with the rights of adults.” 25 In schools,
students do not have the full rights of expression; 26 a full liberty
interest (because of compulsory attendance requirements); 27 or
unqualified rights under the Fourth 28 or Eighth Amendments; 29 In
addition, schools can restrict the promotion of drugs 30 and the use of
threatening, 31 vulgar, or obscene language. 32 Trading these rights
furthers the state and community’s interest in educating students by
allowing schools to provide students with order and security that
they may not receive in any other setting. Students also receive other

22. Id. at 506.
23. See DUPRE, supra note 18, at 10 (“Courts . . . allowed school officials the same
power to make rules regarding student conduct at school as the parent would have at home—
that is, virtually without limit . . . .”).
24. See infra notes 26–32.
25. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 404 (2007) (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403
v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)).
26. Bethel, 478 U.S. at 686–87 (restricting vulgar or obscene speech); Morse, 551 U.S.
at 393 (restricting speech promoting drug use); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S.
260, 260 (1988) (restricting school-sponsored speech); Tinker, 393 U.S. at 503 (restricting all
other disruptive speech).
27. Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510,
534–35 (1925).
28. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 460 U.S. 325, 327 (1985) (holding that searches of students
only need be reasonable); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 646 (1995); Bd. of
Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 822 (2002) (allowing random urinalysis drug testing of
students).
29. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 651 (1977) (finding that corporal punishment
is not cruel and unusual punishment).
30. Morse, 551 U.S. at 393.
31. Wisniewski ex rel. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 38 (2007).
32. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 686–87 (1986).
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benefits that are not necessarily available to them outside of school;
schools provide extra protection to students from physical and
psychological harm through interactions with school staff, who, for
example, must report suspected child abuse 33 and keep potentially
damaging student records confidential. 34
The concept of trading rights is not unique to the school setting.
In many contexts, Americans expect to give up some of their
constitutional rights in order to gain benefits. For example, to
decrease gun violence, Americans have traded a portion of their
Second Amendment right to bear arms by passing laws that restrict
the sale of firearms to certain individuals. 35 Likewise, some Fourth
Amendment rights related to privacy are traded to allow police the
latitude to more effectively fight crime, 36 and employers to discover
employee misconduct. 37 Also, First Amendment rights are routinely
abridged in the workplace to allow employers to control what
messages they sponsor, 38 or to keep the peace in public places. 39
III. UPPING THE ANTE: INCREASING TRADE-OFFS IN SCHOOL
SPEECH
Trading rights in schools benefits not only individual citizens,
but society as a whole. “The state (in the form of the public school)
takes away some liberty from the individual student in order to

33. VICTORIA J. DODD, PRACTICAL EDUCATION LAW FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 284 (2d ed. 2010) (“All states require in some manner that school personnel report
instances of suspected child abuse.”).
34. 20 U.S.C § 1232g (2012).
35. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(d) (2012) (restricting the sale of firearms to, among others,
convicted felons, fugitives, drug addicts, “mental[ly] defective[s],” illegal aliens, dishonorably
discharged soldiers, and stalkers).
36. Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849 (2011) (allowing warrantless entry to prevent
destruction of evidence).
37. City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2630 (2011) (holding a
government employer’s warrantless search is reasonable “when conducted for a
‘noninvestigatory work-related purpos[e]’ or for the ‘investigatio[n] of work-related
misconduct’”).
38. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (holding that “when public
employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, [they] are not speaking as citizens
for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications
from employer discipline”).
39. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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preserve the liberty of a nation.” 40 The history of school speech
explored in this Part illustrates that, inherent in the school speech
trade-off, is the fact that as it becomes more difficult for schools to
provide an orderly and secure environment, students are required to
trade more rights.
Before Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District, 41 freedom of speech was not recognized meaningfully in
public schools. 42 This changed in 1965, when several students who
wore black armbands to school to protest the Vietnam War were
suspended when they refused to remove them. 43 Although the
district court found that the school’s action was “reasonable because
it was based upon their fear of a disturbance,” 44 the Supreme Court
disagreed, reasoning that “undifferentiated fear or apprehension of
disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of
expression.” 45 Students therefore had a right to wear armbands to
school even if the school disapproved.
The Court limited this newly recognized right to student speech
in what has come to be known as the two-prong Tinker test: 46
“conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which . . . involves
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others” 47 was not

40. DUPRE, supra note 18, at 2 (explaining that schools have the “important mission of
educating each generation of new citizens so they will have the tools necessary to preserve and
protect those tenets of democracy upon which the United States was founded”).
41. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
42. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 416 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Tinker
effected a sea change in students’ speech rights, extending them well beyond traditional
bounds.”); Kristi L. Bowman, The Civil Rights Roots of Tinker’s Disruption Tests, 58 AM. U. L.
REV. 1129, 1130 (2009) (“Tinker was quite a departure from what came before it; prior to
Tinker, it was not a foregone conclusion that students had any affirmative speech rights in
public schools.”); Dan L. Johnston, The First Amendment and Education—A Plea for Peaceful
Coexistence, 17 VILL. L. REV., 1023, 1025 (1972) (Before Tinker, most school administrators
felt that they had “absolute authority to decide what would or would not go on within the
school system during school hours, and that the Bill of Rights and the [F]irst [A]mendment
did not apply to the school situation.”).
43. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
44. Id. at 508.
45. Id.
46. Mary Rose Papandrea, Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 60 FLA. L. REV.
1027, 1042 (2008) (“Although virtually all the student speech cases applying Tinker have
focused on its material-and-substantial disruption prong, it is possible that the alternative
prong of Tinker—interference with the rights of others—will become more important
particularly in the context of harassing or demeaning speech.”).
47. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
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constitutionally protected. According to this test, student speech
could still be regulated by schools if the speech 1) caused substantial
disorder to the school, or 2) invaded the rights of others. At the
time, it may have seemed that the Tinker school speech standard was
sufficient to “prescribe and control conduct in the schools.” 48
However, times changed, and the Court came to see how the
“whims and caprices of the[] loudest-mouthed” 49 students created
harmful student speech that survived the Tinker test. Consequently,
over time, the Court added additional limitations to the student
speech doctrine requiring students to trade additional speech rights
to schools.
The first major addition to the doctrine came twenty years after
Tinker in Bethel School District v. Fraser, when a student gave a
student body nominating speech that contained an “explicit sexual
metaphor.” 50 In response, the Supreme Court held that vulgar
student speech should not be given the same protection as adult
speech, even if the school could not have restricted it under Tinker. 51
The Court reasoned that, in addition to curtailing speech that
“intrudes upon the work of the schools or the rights of other
students,” 52 schools should also be able to “inculcate the habits and
manners of civility” and “teach[] students the boundaries of socially
appropriate behavior.” 53
Two years later, in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, a
school principal prevented the publication of two student-authored
articles in a school newspaper because he feared the articles might
invade the privacy of students and expose younger students to ageinappropriate content. 54 The Court discussed Tinker and determined
that, if “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns,” 55 a

48. Id. at 507.
49. Id. at 525 (Black, J., dissenting).
50. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 678 (1986).
51. Id. at 682 (“[T]he First Amendment gives a high school student the classroom right
to wear Tinker’s armband, but not Cohen’s jacket.”) (quoting Thomas v. Bd. of Educ.,
Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1057 (2d Cir. 1979) (Fisher, J., concurring)).
52. Id. at 680.
53. Id. at 681 (quoting C. BEARD & M. BEARD, NEW BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 228 (1968)).
54. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 263 (1988) (withholding from
publication articles featuring current students discussing their parents’ divorces and another
featuring three students’ experiences with pregnancy).
55. Id. at 273.
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school may “disassociate itself not only from speech that would
substantially interfere with its work . . . or impinge upon the rights
of other students, but also from speech that is, for example,
ungrammatical . . . biased or prejudiced, vulgar or profane, or
unsuitable for immature audiences.” 56 Accordingly, after Kuhlmeier,
schools were able to further regulate student speech, to better
“[fulfill] their role as ‘a principal instrument in awakening the
[student] to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional
training, and in helping him adjust normally to his environment.’” 57
In 2007, recognizing the increasingly “difficult” yet “vitally
important” job that school administrators face, 58 the Supreme Court
once more required students to forgo additional speech rights.
During school, students in Juneau, Alaska, were allowed to walk
across the street from their high school to watch the 2002 Olympic
Torch Relay. While waiting for the torch, several students unfurled a
banner that read “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.” 59 The banner’s creator
refused to drop the banner and follow the principal to her office. He
was later suspended. 60 In Morse v. Frederick, the Court held that the
student’s speech was not protected because the government had a
compelling interest in preventing illegal drug use. 61 Even the dissent
agreed that, in light of the mission of schools, “it might well be
appropriate to tolerate some targeted viewpoint discrimination in
this unique setting.” 62
As Fraser and Kuhlmeier were interpreted by lower courts,
schools continued to gain broad latitude in regulating on-campus
student speech. Although Fraser concerned sexually explicit speech,
the Fraser language relating to the promotion of civility has been
applied broadly to include upholding punishments for a student
swearing within earshot of a school secretary, 63 or at another student
in the cafeteria, 64 or refusing to put away a small Confederate flag. 65
Fraser has also been used to uphold dress codes that banned T-shirts
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

1652

Id. at 271 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Id. at 272 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 409 (2007).
Id. at 397.
DUPRE, supra note 18, at 233.
Morse, 551 U.S. at 410.
Id. at 409.
Anderson v. Milbank Sch. Dist. 25-4, 197 F.R.D. 682 (D.S.D. 2000).
Heller v. Hodgin, 928 F. Supp. 789 (S.D. Ind. 1996).
Scott v. Sch. Bd., 324 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir. 2003).
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with sexual innuendo, 66 those that cast the school’s administration in
a negative light, 67 and those that “promote[d] destructive conduct
and demoralizing values.” 68 Kuhlmeier has also been broadly applied
to other extracurricular activities such as protecting an
administrator’s choice to change the school’s mascot, 69 disciplining a
student who gave a candidate’s speech that was “in bad taste,” 70 and
allowing the school to remove material a student repeatedly posted
in her workspace that offended classmates. 71
Although this broad authority concerns some scholars, 72 when
schools have encroached impermissibly upon the core speech rights
of students, courts have stepped in to keep schools in check. For
instance, the Ninth Circuit ruled against a school when it attempted
to use Hazelwood to ban anti-draft advertisements in a school paper,
although it allowed advertisements from military recruiters; 73 and a
Michigan federal district court ruled against a school when it
attempted to censor a student article on a pending lawsuit against
the school district because the superintendent disagreed with the
student’s views. 74
It could be argued that Morse has a very narrow application to
only student speech that refers to illegal drugs, and some courts have
applied it accordingly. 75 However, like Fraser and Kuhlmeier, it too
has gradually been applied broadly to other types of speech when
courts feel that doing so helps schools “protect those entrusted to
66. Pyle ex rel. Pyle v. S. Hadley Sch. Comm., 861 F. Supp. 157, 158–59 (D. Mass.
1994) (applying school dress code to T-shirt slogans including: “See Dick Drink. See Dick
Drive. See Dick Die. Don’t be a Dick” and “Coed Naked Band: Do It to the Rhythm.”).
67. Gano v. Sch. Dist. No. 411, 674 F. Supp. 796, 797 (D. Idaho 1987) (denying
student’s request to wear a shirt depicting three school administrators with alcoholic beverages
acting drunk).
68. Boroff v. Van Wert City Bd. of Educ., 220 F.3d 465, 469 (6th Cir. 2000)
(upholding prohibition of Marilyn Manson T-shirts).
69. Crosby ex rel. Crosby v. Holsinger, 852 F.2d 801, 802 (4th Cir. 1988) (upholding
the change of mascot “Johnny Reb” because it offended black students).
70. Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757, 759–62 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that “[t]he
universe of legitimate pedagogical concerns is by no means confined to the academic”).
71. Fister v. Minn. New Country Sch., 149 F.3d 1187 (D. Minn. 1998).
72. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Students Do Leave Their First Amendment Rights
at the Schoolhouse Gates: What’s Left of Tinker?, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 527 (2000).
73. San Diego Comm. Against Registration & the Draft v. Governing Bd., 790 F.2d
1471, 1478 (9th Cir. 1986).
74. Dean ex rel. Elsarelli v. Utica Cmty. Schs., 345 F. Supp. 2d 799, 803 (E.D. Mich.
2004).
75. DeFabio v. E. Hampton Union Free Sch. Dist., 623 F.3d 71, 77 (2d Cir. 2010)
(“Speech that can ‘reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal drug use’ may be restricted by
school administrators.”).
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their care.” 76 Since one rationale for the holding of Morse was to
avoid the “severe and permanent damage to the health and wellbeing of young people,” 77 Morse has been used to support the
punishment of speech promoting other kinds of actions that may
affect the health and well-being of students, including threats of
school violence, 78 speech promoting illegal behavior, 79 and speech
promoting racial conflict. 80
Under the current school speech doctrine, schools expect to be
able to regulate speech that is potentially disruptive, lewd or vulgar,
or dangerous in exchange for the benefits of public education they
provide. Similarly, parents and students accept these regulations and
make these concessions because they expect doing so will allow
schools both to protect students from harm and to facilitate a
positive learning environment.
IV. THE CYBERBULLY RIP-OFF
In 1968, the Tinker Court could not have imagined the avenues
for student speech that currently create serious challenges for today’s
schools. Back then, teens watched the Monkees or Star Trek 81 on
black-and-white televisions. 82 Today’s teens can watch Vampire
Diaries or American Idol 83 at any location via the Internet 84 on their

76. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 408 (2007).
77. Id. at 407.
78. Boim v. Fulton Cnty. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 978, 984 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Morse, 551 U.S. at 408) (reasoning that just as Morse restricted student speech “‘that they
reasonably regard as promoting illegal drug use,’” so too a court should permit schools to
restrict student speech “reasonably construed as a threat of school violence”).
79. Miller ex rel. Miller v. Penn Manor Sch. Dist., 588 F. Supp. 2d 606, 623 (E.D. Pa.
2008).
80. Defoe ex rel. Defoe v. Spiva, 625 F.3d 324, 339 (6th Cir. 2010) (“If we substitute
‘racial conflict’ for ‘drug abuse,’ the analysis in Morse is practically on all fours with this case.”).
81. 1968 TV Shows, TV PARTY, http://www.tvparty.com/fall68.html (last visited Jan.
16, 2014).
82. Richard Powelson, First Color Television Sets Were Sold 50 Years Ago, POST
GAZETTE.COM
(Dec.
31,
2003),
http://old.postgazette.com/tv/20031231colortv1231p3.asp (stating that many Americans did not enjoy
color television until the late 1960s when set prices dropped and more programs were available
in color).
83. Laurel Brown, 2012 Teen Choice Awards Nominees: ‘Vampire Diaries,’ ‘Idol’ and
Bieber Score Big, BUDDY TV (May 18, 2012), http://www.buddytv.com/articles/thevampire-diaries/check-out-the-first-round-of-t-45748.aspx.
84. See Amanda Lenhart et al., Social Media and Young Adults, PEW INTERNET (Feb. 3,
2010),
http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2010/Social-Media-and-Young-Adults.aspx
(stating that 73% of teenagers ages 12–17 access content on the internet).
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smart phones or laptops. 85 This proliferation of technology has given
the age-old problem of bullying a high-tech platform.
In August 2010, the U.S. Department of Education held its first
federal bullying prevention summit. At the summit, Secretary of
Education, Arne Duncan, stated that “bullying is very much an
education priority that goes to the heart of school performance and
school culture,” and “[c]yber-bullying . . . is a new and especially
insidious form of bullying.” 86 Cyberbullying “refers to any kind of
harassment that takes place on the Internet or over text messaging,”
and is usually perpetrated by students against their peers. 87 Recent
research also recognizes the growing problem of teacher
victimization by students, 88 including the cyberbullying of teachers. 89
Cyberbullies can threaten anonymously, 90 incessantly, and often
with impunity. 91 The negative effects 92 on the victims of
cyberbullying may be even stronger than traditional bullying because
it is so pervasive. Victims cannot physically escape cyberbullies 93 and
85. Amanda Lenhart, Teens, Smartphones & Texting, PEW INTERNET 3, 27 (Mar. 19,
2012),
available
at
http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2012/PIP_Teens_
Smartphones_and_Texting.pdf (stating that 23% of all teens ages 12–17 have a smartphone,
31% of teens ages 14–17 have a smartphone and 74% of all teens ages 12–17 own a desktop or
laptop computer).
86. Arne Duncan, Sec’y of Educ., U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Keynote Address at the Federal
Partners in Bullying Prevention Summit: The Myths About Bullying (Aug. 11, 2010),
available
at
http://www.ed.gov/news/speeches/myths-about-bullying-secretary-arneduncans-remarks-bullying-prevention-summit.
87. Mary Kingston, Board Member Testifies at Cyber Safety Hearing, EDUC. DIGEST,
Jan. 2011, at 10.
88. Dorothy Espelage et al., Understanding and Preventing Violence Directed Against
Teachers, AM. PSYCHOLOGIST, Feb.–Mar. 2013, at 75.
89. Teemu Kauppi & Maili Pörhölä, School Teachers Bullied by Their Students: Teachers’
Attributions and How They Share Their Experiences, 28 TEACHING AND TCHR. EDUC. 1059,
1060 (2012).
90. Robert S. Tokunaga, Following You Home from School: A Critical Review and
Synthesis of Research on Cyberbullying Victimization, COMPUTERS IN HUM. BEHAV. 277, 279
(explaining that because of the anonymity offered through electronic media, cyberbullying is
an “opportunistic offense” where “[s]tudents who would not otherwise engage in traditional
bullying behaviors do so online”).
91. Id. (“Instructors or school administrators are seen as agents of enforcement in
traditional bullying. In cyberbullying, however, there is no clear individual or groups who serve
to regulate deviant behaviors on the Internet.”).
92. Id. at 277 (“Victims of cyberbullying have lower self-esteem, higher levels of
depression, and experience significant life challenges.”).
93. Id. at 279 (“Victims can be reached through their cellular phones, e-mail, and
instant messengers at any given time of the day.”).
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cyberbullies can “victimize a greater number of targets in front of a
larger audience without significant risk.” 94 The practice takes on a
heightened “measure of mean-spiritedness . . . [b]ecause technology
provides a screen behind which young people may hide” where they
do not “have to be accountable for their actions.”95 This anonymity
not only “emboldens” the perpetrators, it also “increases the fear
factor for the victim.” 96 This disinhibition creates a sense of
invincibility where “[i]ndividuals who might otherwise be afraid to
engage in bullying behavior . . . are more willing to do so.” 97
Perhaps this is why the gender pattern of cyberbullying is “the
opposite of what happens off-line.” 98 Face-to-face, boys tend to be
the school bullies, whereas “online, girls are the major players.” 99
Because much student electronic speech originates off-campus,
courts first hesitated to classify it as school speech. 100 Some
scholars101 still feel that “a child engaging in otherwise protected
expression off campus and from a non-school-owned computer
would seem to have a solid First Amendment right to engage in such
expression.” 102 However, a number of district and circuit courts have
determined that “off-campus speech that subsequently is brought to
campus or to the attention of school authorities [is subject to] the
substantial disruption test from Tinker without regard to the
location where the speech originated.” 103 Unfortunately, because of
the covert nature of cyberbullying, its effects often do not qualify as a

94. John Snakenborg, et al., Cyberbullying: Prevention and Intervention to Protect Our
Children and Youth, 55 PREVENTING SCH. FAILURE 88, 90 (2011).
95. Andrew V. Beale & Kimberly R. Hall, Cyberbullying: What School Administrators
(and Parents) Can Do, 81 THE CLEARING HOUSE, Sept.–Oct. 2007, at 8.
96. Id.
97. Snakenborg et al., supra note 94, at 90.
98. Beale & Hall, supra note 95, at 8.
99. Id.
100. E.g., Emmett v. Kent School District, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1089 (W.D. Wash.
2000).
101. Lee Goldman, Student Speech and the First Amendment: A Comprehensive Approach,
63 FLA. L. REV. 395 (2011) (arguing that Tinker does not apply to student speech that is
outside the supervision of the school); Papandrea, supra note 46, at, 1094–95 (“[P]unish[ing]
students for any digital expression that harasses or bullies . . . pose[s] a grave threat to juvenile
speech rights.”).
102. Christine Metteer Lorillard, When Children’s Rights “Collide”: Free Speech vs. The
Right to be Left Alone in the Context of Off-Campus “Cyber-bullying,” 81 MISS. L.J. 189, 196 (2011).
103. J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1103
(C.D. Cal. 2010).
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substantial disruption under Tinker. Even in situations where great
disruption occurs to one teacher, administrator, or student, 104 and
could spread to others if unchecked, courts have hesitated to find
substantial disruption to the work of the school as a whole. 105
In Layshock v. Hermitage School District, a high school senior
created a vulgar MySpace “parody profile” of his principal, offcampus during non-school hours, that characterized the principal as
a marijuana-smoking, promiscuous alcoholic. 106 Later, he accessed
the profile at school and showed it to other students. 107 Although
three other students, in efforts to “one-up” each other, posted their
own profiles, which were more “vulgar and more offensive” 108 than
the first, and the school district had to limit students’ access to the
internet and cancel the computer programming classes for a week, 109
the court’s en banc panel determined, under Tinker, that there was
no “foreseeable and substantial disruption of school,” and the
student’s speech was protected. 110
J.S. v. Blue Mountain School District was decided the same day as
Layshock by the same Third Circuit panel. Perhaps unsurprisingly, in
J.S., the panel reached the same conclusion as in Layshock. 111 An
eighth-grader and her friend created a vulgar MySpace profile of her
school principal on her home computer. 112 The profile used graphic
language to portray the principal as a bisexual, child-molesting sex
addict. 113 The school district argued that the profile disrupted school
because students were discussing the profile in class and staff had to

104. Thomas E. Wheeler, Lessons From Lord of the Flies: The Responsibility of Schools to
Protect Students From Internet Threats and Cyber-Hate Speech, 215 EDUC. L. REP. 227, 241
(2007) (discussing the problem of “off-campus speech that has the practical effect of
precluding only one or a few students from receiving the benefits of a public education because
of the nature of that speech”).
105. J.C., 711 F. Supp. 2d at 1121 (holding that “no reasonable fact finder could
conclude that the YouTube video [that the student posted harassing a fellow student] was
reasonably likely to cause . . . substantial disruption”).
106. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 207 (3d Cir. 2011).
107. Id. at 209.
108. Id. at 208.
109. Id. at 209.
110. Id. at 219.
111. J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d. 915, 933 (3d Cir. 2011).
112. Id. at 920.
113. Id. at 920–21. The profile professed that the principal’s interests included hitting on
students and their parents, having “any kind” of sex in his office, and “riding the fraintrain”—a
reference to the principal’s wife and counselor at the school, Deborah Frain. Id. at 921, 941.
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be reassigned to deal with the two students. 114 In the deeply divided
en banc decision, the court again concluded that, under Tinker, no
substantial disruption occurred and J.S.’s Internet speech was
protected. 115
The decisions in Layshock and J.S. are a rip-off to students and
parents because the bullying of school staff affects the ability of a
school to provide a quality education. The principal in Layshock
found the profile degrading, demeaning, and demoralizing, 116 and
scholars have found that teacher bullying is not only demoralizing,
but also affects the ability of teachers to teach their students. 117
Further, although school administrators do not always teach classes,
their ability to effectively lead the school is affected by bullying
directed towards them and other staff members. The J.S. dissent
acknowledged that “[b]roadcasting a personal attack against a school
official . . . not only causes psychological harm to the targeted
individuals but also undermines the authority of the school,” 118 and
that “[i]nsubordinate speech always interrupts the educational
process . . . [;] [f]ailing to take action . . . would not only encourage
the offending student to repeat the conduct, but also would serve to
foster an attitude of disrespect towards teachers and staff.” 119 The
J.S. dissent concluded that the majority’s decision left schools
“powerless to discipline students for the consequences of their
actions,” 120 and had “unwisely tipped the balance struck by Tinker,
Fraser, Kuhlmeier and Morse, thereby jeopardizing schools’ ability to
maintain an orderly learning environment.” 121
In addition, scholars have found that both “[t]eachers and other
school staff members who experience . . . abusive interactions with
students” are not only at risk for “impaired . . . performance” but
also for leaving the profession. 122 The J.S. dissent recognized that
114. Id. at 923.
115. Id. at 933.
116. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 209 (3d Cir. 2011).
117. Espelage et al., supra note 88, at 77.
118. J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 941 (3d Cir. 2011) (Fisher, J.,
dissenting).
119. Id. at 945 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 941 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 952 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
122. Anne Gregory et al., Teacher Safety and Authoritative School Climate in High Schools,
118 AM. J. OF EDUC. 401, 401 (asserting that teacher victimization therefore contributes “to
the high national rates of . . . attrition”).
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“[t]his kind of harassment has tangible effects on educators. It may
cause [them] to leave the school and stop teaching altogether.” 123
Precedent that leads to impaired teacher performance, undermines
school authority, and contributes to attrition cheats parents,
students, and the community, who have already traded numerous
rights to receive the benefits of a public education, including a
supportive atmosphere of civility and order.
Notably, had either of these profiles been circulated on paper at
school, they absolutely could have been regulated under Fraser
because they were lewd and vulgar, or possibly under Tinker because
paper copies of the profile could likely not have been circulated
without creating a substantial disruption. Ironically, the Third
Circuit earlier noted this tension between regulating cyber and
traditional bullying. In a school speech case decided prior to Layshock
and J.S., the Third Circuit found a student’s off-campus internet
speech unprotected when she referred to school administrators as
“douchebags” and stated that had the student “distributed her
electronic posting as a handbill on school grounds, this case would
fall squarely within the Supreme Court’s precedents” holding that
“offensive forms of expression may be prohibited.” 124
As serious as educational staff victimization is to learning, the
more poignant rip-off to parents and students is when a student,
rather than a principal, is on the receiving end of cyberbullying. In
J.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified School District, J.C. and several friends
made a video in which they ridiculed fellow classmate C.C., calling
her a “slut” and the “ugliest piece of shit I’ve ever seen in my whole
life.” 125 J.C. posted the video on YouTube and contacted C.C. and
five to ten other students, encouraging them to view the video. 126
Later, a school counselor estimated that about half of the eighth
grade eventually viewed the video. 127 The next day, C.C. went to
school with her mother, crying and telling administrators that she
felt too humiliated to go to class. 128 Although the district court
determined the speech occurred off-campus, it cited a “long line of
123. J.S., 650 F.3d at 946 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
124. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 49 (2d Cir. 2008).
125. J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1098
(C.D. Cal. 2010).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1120.
128. Id.
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cases” 129 that supported the “off-campus character [of the speech]
does not necessarily insulate the student from school discipline,” 130
and that “Tinker applies to both on-campus and off-campus
speech.” 131 However, as in Layshock and J.S., the court concluded
that under Tinker there was no substantial disruption to the school
from the posting of J.C.’s video, so her speech was protected. 132 The
court did discuss Tinker’s “rights of others” prong, but felt
insufficient authority existed to apply the prong to “speech that may
cause some emotional harm to a student.” 133 So, despite the harm to
C.C. and her education, J.C. could not be punished.
V. ENDING THE CYBERBULLYING RIP-OFF
Some scholars have called for the Supreme Court to remedy the
inadequacy of Tinker’s substantial disruption test in order to address
cyberbullying. 134 Unfortunately, the Court does not appear ready to
issue any guidance soon. 135 However, new precedent may not be
necessary to end the cyberbullying rip-off if courts will apply Tinker’s
“rights of others” prong, which allows schools to regulate speech
that invades “the rights of other[s]. . . to be secure and to be let
alone.” 136 The Fourth Circuit recently used this prong in
conjunction with the substantial disruption prong, and other circuits
have suggested that the “rights of others” prong could stand alone
in regulation of student speech. 137 Circuits should allow the “rights
of others” prong to stand alone to keep the school speech trade-off
from shortchanging students and parents.
129. Id. at 1105.
130. Id. at 1106.
131. Id. at 1108.
132. Id. at 1120.
133. Id. at 1123.
134. Martha McCarthy, Commentary, Student Electronic Expression: Unanswered
Questions Persist, 277 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 19 (2012) [hereinafter Unanswered Questions] (“[A]
decision clarifying the reach of the First Amendment to student expression initiated off school
grounds but accessible to the school community would be very helpful to school personnel.”).
See generally Philip T.K. Daniel & Scott Greytak, Commentary, A Need to Sharpen the First
Amendment Contours of Off-Campus Student Speech, 273 EDUC. L. REP. 21 (2011).
135. Three of the school speech cases discussed in this Comment were denied certiorari
Jan, 17, 2012: Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied,
132 S. Ct. 1095 (2012); J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012); and Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir.
2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012).
136. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
137. See discussion infra Part V.B.4.
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A. Considering the Rights of Others with the Substantial Disruption
Standard
It is not clear why early courts addressing student Internet
speech cases ignored the “rights of others” prong entirely. 138
Fortunately, the only two federal cases addressing student-onstudent cyber-bulling both mention it, although they treat the prong
differently. 139 In J.C., as mentioned above, the court found the
prong inapplicable, but in Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools, “the
Fourth Circuit seemed to connect the two prongs in a novel way by
reasoning that interference with the rights of others creates the
disruption required to trigger Tinker’s exception.” 140 Kowalski, a
high school senior, created a MySpace discussion group after school
on her home computer to ridicule another student, Shay N. 141 She
invited approximately 100 of her MySpace “friends” to join the
group, entitled “S.A.S.H. (Students Against Shay’s Herpes).” 142 The
students, took turns making derogatory comments about Shay and
posted pictures of her with an X across her crotch accompanied by
the message, “Warning: Enter at your own risk.” 143 Shay and her
parents met with the vice principal the next day, filed a harassment
complaint, and returned home. 144 Kowalski was suspended from
school for ten days and from social activities for ninety days. 145
The Fourth Circuit upheld the school’s discipline and
determined that Tinker applied, quoting the entire two-prong test
twice. 146 As scholar Martha McCarthy noted, “In several places, the
138. Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist., 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2000); Beussink v.
Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
139. Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 565; J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711
F. Supp. 2d 1094 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
140. Unanswered Questions, supra note 134, at 10.
141. Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 567.
142. Id. (“Kowalski claimed in her deposition that ‘S.A.S.H.’ was an acronym for
‘Students Against Sluts Herpes,’ but a classmate, Ray Parsons, stated that it was an acronym for
‘Students Against Shay’s Herpes.’”).
143. Id. at 568 (stating another posted picture of her was captioned, “portrait of a whore”).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 568–69. Her school suspension was reduced to five days, but her social
suspension was upheld, preventing her from participating on the cheerleading squad for the
rest of the year and from crowning the school’s next “Queen of Charm” as she had been
elected Queen the previous year. Id. at 569.
146. Id. at 571 (“[I]n Tinker . . . student speech . . . was protected because it did not
‘materially and substantially interfer[e] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the
operation of the school’ [or] collid[e] with the rights of others.”).
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Fourth Circuit seemed to give credence to Tinker’s second prong as
a viable exception to constitutional protection of student expression
that collides with the rights of others.” 147 The court stated that
“[b]ecause the Internet-based bullying and harassment in this case
could reasonably be expected to interfere with the rights of a student
at Musselman High School and thus disrupt the school learning
environment, Kowalski was indeed on notice that Mussel-man [sic]
High School administrators could regulate and punish the conduct
at issue here.” 148
Kowalski keeps with the broad reading of school speech
precedent and prevents the cyberbullying rip-off by allowing schools
to punish cyberbullies. However, this approach is not the most
effective because tying the “rights of others” to “substantial
disruption” may lead to disparate discipline against different
cyberbullies depending on which victims they select. Kowalski
allowed that invading Shay’s rights could create substantial
disruption by focusing on how Shay had to miss school because of
the harassment, and how, because classmates descended on Shay in a
“pack,” 149 potential existed for a “snowballing effect” of abuse. 150
This use of “substantial disruption” requires a court to consider the
outward effects of cyberbullying on the victim in determining
whether to uphold school discipline. This interpretation could
encourage bullies to seek out victims who are less likely to seek help.
Students who have little parental support, are already susceptible to
depression, or are just afraid of retaliation from cyberbullies may hide
how they are affected by cyberbullying, but cyberbullying of these
victims could actually have the most tragic results. 151 If courts can
determine that cyberbullying itself collides with the rights of others
and deserves discipline regardless of the victim’s reaction, only then
have courts truly ended the cyberbully rip-off.

147. Unanswered Questions, supra note 134, at 10.
148. Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 575–76 (emphasis added).
149. Id. at 576.
150. Id. at 574.
151. Cyberbullying-linked Suicides Rising Study Says, CBC NEWS (Oct. 20, 2012),
http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/story/2012/10/19/cyberbullying-suicide-study.html
(finding that “[t]here have been 41 suicides since 2003 involving cyberbullying in the United
States, Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom”).
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B. Letting the “Rights of Others” Prong Stand Alone

Tinker’s substantial disruption standard falls short of addressing
cyberbullying that targets students individually. In some cases of
cyberbullying, educational disruption may only be felt by an
individual, rather than throughout the school. Other
commentators152 have also suggested that allowing the “rights of
others” prong to stand alone is a viable solution to addressing cases
of cyberbullying. Philip Daniel stated, “[t]hough the right of
students to attend school free from psychological harm has rarely
been discussed in courts, it presents a promising analytical framework
for school personnel to wield against cyberbullies’ potential First
Amendment claims.” 153 Accordingly, the school district in J.S. seized
upon the “rights of others” prong to justify its regulation of J.S.’s
cyber speech. 154 But, as discussed above, the court did not accept
this argument and found against the school. As in J.S., courts have
been hesitant to apply the second prong of Tinker alone, presumably
because there is little case law defining the standard. 155
The balance of this Part argues that allowing the “rights of
others” prong to alone justify the regulation of school speech is
supported by Supreme Court and circuit precedent and that a usable
definition of the “rights of others” is not impossible to craft. Support
for the independent use of the “rights of others” prong can be found
in the Tinker text itself, the circuit cases relied upon to create the
Tinker test, Tinker analysis in past Supreme Court school speech
cases, and reasoning by other circuits. Together, these sources
provide ample support for lower courts to allow school regulation of
student speech under the “rights of others” prong of the Tinker test.
152. E.g., Joe Dryden, It’s a Matter of Life and Death: Judicial Support for School
Authority over Off-Campus Student Cyber Bullying and Harassment, 33 U. LA VERNE L. REV.
171 (2012); Martha McCarthy, Curtailing Degrading Student Expression: Is a Link to
Disruption Required?, 38 J. L. & EDUC. 607 (2009); Martha McCarthy, Student Expression
that Collides with the Rights of Others: Should the Second Prong of Tinker Stand Alone?, 240
EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2009).
153. Philip T.K. Daniel, Commentary, Bullying and Cyberbullying in Schools: An Analysis
of Student Free Expression, Zero Tolerance Policies, and State Anti-Harassment Legislation, 268
EDUC. L. REP. 619, 632 (2011).
154. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 931 n.9 (3d Cir.
2011).
155. J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1123
(C.D. Cal. 2010) (“[T]he Court is not aware of any authority . . . that extends the Tinker
rights of others prong so far . . . . This court declines to be the first.”).
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Courts should act accordingly, allowing schools more tools to
protect the trade-offs they require students to make.
1. The stand-alone use of the “rights of others” prong is allowed by the
text of Tinker
The Tinker test is outlined several times in the opinion, always
using the disjunctive “or” between the disruption prong and the
“rights of others” prong. In the first articulation, the “rights of
others” is mentioned twice:
There is here no evidence whatever of petitioners’ interference,
actual or nascent, with the schools’ work OR of collision of the
rights of other students to be secure and to be let alone. Accordingly,
this case does not concern speech or action that intrudes upon the
work of the schools OR the rights of other students. 156

The standard is summarized in full at the end of the opinion:
[C]onduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any
reason—whether it stems from time, place or type of behavior—
materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder OR
invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech. 157

Although court opinions are not necessarily subject to the rules
of statutory interpretation, it is prudent to assume that the holding
of a case, “ought . . . to be so construed that, if it can be prevented,
no clause, sentence, or word will be superfluous, void, nugatory, or
insignificant.” 158 This is particularly true when interpreting the
critical provisions of the case where the Court is articulating a novel
legal test. In a relatively short opinion, 159 why would the majority
repeatedly mention “the rights of others” as part of its disjunctive
test if the phrase were to have no independent meaning? The best
reading of the Tinker test would ascribe significance to each half of
the Court’s disjunctive test—not merely to one of two clearly
articulated prongs.

156. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969)
(emphasis and capitalization added).
157. Id. at 513 (emphasis and capitalization added).
158. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 433 (2012).
159. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 503–14. The majority opinion is only eleven pages long.
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The Court does more than merely reference the “rights of
others” in its articulations of the Tinker test. In fact, the Court
discusses “the rights of others” five times. The Court found there was
no evidence that the wearing of armbands was in “collision with the
rights of other students to be secure and to be let alone,” 160 nor that
the armbands “impinge[d] upon the rights of other students.” 161
The Court affirmed that opinions expressed “without colliding with
the rights of others” 162 and without seeking “to intrude in the school
affairs or the lives of others” 163 were permissible but held that the
“invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the
[Constitution].” 164 This discussion of the “rights of others”
demonstrates that the Court felt that this prong of the test held
meaning independent of the substantial disruption prong. A full and
fair reading of the Tinker decision supports the use of each prong
independently of the other.
2. The “rights of others” test is supported by cases relied on by Tinker
No Supreme Court precedent before Tinker predicted its
outcome. 165 In crafting the Tinker test, the Court relied instead
upon decisions in two Fifth Circuit civil rights cases, Burnside v.
Byars and Blackwell v. Issaquena County Board of Education 166 that
involved student speech similar to that in Tinker. In Burnside v.
Byars, black students at the all-black Booker T. Washington High
School in Philadelphia, Mississippi, wore “freedom buttons” that
included the phrase “One Man One Vote” 167 to protest the denial of
voting rights to black adults. 168 Like the principal in Tinker, the
black principal 169 threatened to suspend any student who wore one
of the buttons, fearing the buttons “would cause commotion, and

160. Id. at 508.
161. Id. at 509.
162. Id. at 513.
163. Id. at 514.
164. Id. at 513.
165. Bowman, supra note 42, at 1130 (“Looking at Supreme Court precedent alone, it
would seem as though the Tinker tests were created out of whole cloth . . . .”).
166. Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966); Blackwell v. Issaquena Cnty. Bd.
of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966).
167. Burnside, 363 F.2d at 746.
168. Bowman, supra note 42, at 1131.
169. Id. at 1136.
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would be disturbing [to] the school program.” 170 The district court
shared the principal’s concern and upheld the school’s regulation. 171
These concerns were well warranted considering the volatile political
climate in Mississippi at the time. 172 The Fifth Circuit, however,
determined that since there was “no interference with educational
activity,” the students’ speech was protected. 173
In Blackwell v. Issaquena County Board of Education 174
consolidated with Burnside and decided on the same day by the same
Fifth Circuit panel, 175 students at the all-black Henry Weathers High
School, in Rolling Fork, Mississippi, wore their freedom buttons to
school. 176 After their school’s black principal 177 heard several students
talking loudly in the hall when they should have been in class, he
called an assembly and notified the students that if they continued
wearing the buttons and disrupting school, they would be
suspended. 178 Throughout the week, many students were suspended
and sent home. Some of those students returned to the school, tried
to pin buttons on other students, and tried to get the non-suspended
students to leave school too. 179 At least one student who had been
suspended entered a classroom during class to enlist other students
in the cause, and some students threw the buttons into the building
through the windows. 180 The court upheld the school’s discipline
because the students not only disrupted the school but also invaded
the rights of others through their protest. 181
The disruption in Blackwell was clearly more substantial than in
Burnside. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit could have used the

170. Burnside, 363 F.2d at 746–47 (alterations in original) (internal quotations omitted).
171. Id. at 746.
172. Bowman, supra note 42 at 1134–35. In the summer of 1964 President Lyndon B.
Johnson had just signed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and hundreds of civil rights volunteers,
mainly from the North, flocked to the South to register black voters. Just six weeks earlier, the
mutilated bodies of three of these voter registration volunteers—their story is featured in the
movie MISSISSIPPI BURNING—were found in an earthen dam near Philadelphia, Mississippi. Id.
173. Burnside, 363 F.2d at 748.
174. Blackwell v. Issaquena Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966).
175. Bowman, supra note 42, at 1141.
176. Blackwell, 363 F.2d at 750.
177. Bowman, supra note 42, at 1139.
178. Blackwell, 363 F.2d at 750–51.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 752.
181. Id. at 754.
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magnitude of the disruption alone to measure whether the students’
speech was protected. Instead, the court upheld the school’s
discipline, not only because the student created a disruption, but
because by doing so, they had shown “complete disregard for the
rights of their fellow students.” 182 The court repeated that the
button-wearing students’ right to speak could not “[collide] with the
rights of others.” 183
The Supreme Court could have adopted only the Burnside
“substantial disruption” standard in crafting the Tinker test, and
distinguished Blackwell by the disruption standard alone. In fact,
early drafts of the majority opinion omit the mention of Burnside or
Blackwell and “the rights of others” completely. 184 However, after
his law clerk Marcia Field 185 wrote to Justice Fortas pointing out that
the weighing of the rights of others was what distinguished Tinker
and the fact-similar Burnside from Blackwell, 186 this concept found
its way into his majority opinion. Presumably, when Justice Fortas
revised his Tinker opinion to include “the rights of others” prong
from Blackwell with a disjunctive “or” after the “substantial
disruption” prong, he meant to clarify that both speech that is
substantially disruptive and speech that collided with the rights of
others is not protected by the First Amendment.
3. The “rights of others” prong is allowed by subsequent Supreme Court
school speech rulings
Subsequent Supreme Court opinions either articulate the entire
two-prong Tinker test, or craft new rules after determining that
Tinker does not apply. No subsequent precedent questions the
validity of the “rights of others” prong.
a. Fraser v. Bethel School District. Justice Burger’s majority
opinion in Fraser addresses both prongs of Tinker. 187 It does so by
noting, first, that Fraser’s speech interfered with the work of school
because “a highly appropriate function of public school education

182. Id. at 753.
183. Id. at 754.
184. Bowman, supra note 42, at 1161.
185. Id. at 1159 n.181. Field went on to teach at Harvard Law School and became the
second woman to be awarded tenure there. Id.
186. Id. at 1161.
187. Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986).
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[is] to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public
discourse,” 188 and, second, that Fraser’s speech intruded upon the
rights of other students. 189 The Court explained this second point:
“By glorifying male sexuality . . . the speech was acutely insulting to
teenage girl[s] . . . [and] could well be seriously damaging to its less
mature audience, many of whom were only 14 years old.”190 This
language clearly allows lower courts to consider the negative
psychological effects of challenged speech on the rights of others in
school when determining whether school regulation is
constitutionally permissible.
b. Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier. When this case was before the Eighth
Circuit, the court ruled that a school newspaper could not be censored
unless it met the Tinker test.191 In articulating the test, the Eighth Circuit
applied both prongs of Tinker.192 Unfortunately, since the Tinker court
did not explicitly elaborate on what the “invasion of the rights of
others”193 entailed, the Eighth Circuit deferred to a student-written law
review article on school newspapers194 that opined that “the rights of
others” prong only referred to conduct that would open the school up to
tort liability.195 When the Supreme Court reversed, it gave no credit to
the Eighth Circuit’s Tinker analysis196 and fully articulated the two-prong
Tinker test in its own opinion.197 Therefore, after Kuhlmeier, the Tinker
standard stood unmodified as the Court left it in Fraser, neither
expanding upon—nor, most importantly, limiting—the applicability of
the “rights of others” prong.

188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. (emphasis added).
191. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 265 (1988).
192. Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1371 (8th Cir. 1986), rev’d
sub nom. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
193. Id. at 1375 (“We must first determine what the Tinker Court meant by ‘invasion of
the rights of others.’”).
194. Note, Administrative Regulation of the High School Press, 83 MICH. L. REV. 625
(1984).
195. Kuhlmeier, 795 F.2d at 1375–76.
196. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 273 n.5 (“We therefore need not decide whether the Court
of Appeals correctly construed Tinker as precluding school officials from censoring student
speech to avoid ‘invasion of the rights of others,’ except where that speech could result in tort
liability to the school.”).
197. Id. at 266 (“[Students] cannot be punished . . . unless school authorities have
reason to believe that such expression will ‘substantially interfere with the work of the school
or impinge upon the rights of other students.’”).
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c. Morse v. Frederick. Although a reasonable reading of Fraser
may reveal that it demonstrates a Tinker analysis, 198 in Morse, Justice
Roberts determined that the Tinker standard was not applied at all in
Fraser. 199 This led him to believe that the Tinker analysis was “not
absolute.” 200 However, in cases where the Supreme Court would
find Tinker still applicable, nothing in Morse suggests that the second
prong is not viable on its own. In addition, the dissent in Morse
discussed the “rights of others” prong independently by arguing that
there was no evidence that the “banner’s reference to drug
paraphernalia willful[ly] infringed on anyone’s rights.” 201
4. The “rights of others” prong has been recognized by circuit courts
As early as 1977, circuit courts recognized Tinker’s “rights of
others” as a separate prong from the substantial disruption prong. In
Trachtman v. Anker, 202 the Second Circuit prevented a student
newspaper staff from distributing an anonymous survey asking about
students’ sexual behavior because under Tinker’s second prong it
would “invade the rights of other students by subjecting them to
psychological pressures which may engender significant emotional
harm.” 203 Even the plaintiffs did not argue that the school lacked
authority to “protect the physical and psychological well being of
students while they [were] on school grounds”; rather, they argued
only that their right of expression in giving the survey outweighed
this interest of other students who might be harmed. 204
Further, in spite of its decisions in J.S. and Layshock, the Third
Circuit has formerly given credence to Tinker’s second prong. In
Saxe v. State College Area School District, the Third Circuit found a
school district’s policy that prohibited any speech creating an

198. Id. at 281–82 (Brennan, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting) (“This Court
applied the Tinker test just a term ago in Fraser . . . . Fraser faithfully applied Tinker.”).
199. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007) (“Fraser . . . certainly did not
conduct the ‘substantial disruption’ analysis prescribed in Tinker.”) The majority in Kuhlmeier
agreed. “The dissent perceives no difference between the First Amendment analysis applied in
Tinker and that applied in Fraser. We disagree.” 484 U.S. at 271 (majority opinion).
200. Morse, 551 U.S. at 405.
201. Id. at 440 (Stevens, Souter & Ginsberg, JJ., dissenting) (internal quotations
omitted).
202. Trachtman v. Anker , 563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977).
203. Id. at 516.
204. Id. (emphasis added).
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“intimidating, hostile or offensive environment” overbroad, but
suggested that under Tinker’s second prong such a policy might be
constitutional 205 if it “require[d] [a] . . . threshold showing of
severity or pervasiveness.” 206 Later, the Third Circuit found in
Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Regional Board of Education, that the
school could regulate speech promoting racial hatred 207 because of
its likelihood to cause disruption, but that the school could not
regulate speech that promoted general “ill-will.” 208 The dissent
argued that because “Tinker spoke not only in terms of disruption of
school activities but in the disjunctive, interference with the rights of
others,” 209 that schools should also be able to restrict speech with
“element[s] of enmity, spite, or improper purpose.” 210
In Harper v. Poway School District, 211 the Ninth Circuit found
that a student’s speech was unprotected solely under the “rights of
others” prong 212 when he refused to change his shirt containing a
message condemning homosexuality during the school’s Day of
Silence. 213 The court reasoned that since most children attend public
school 214 and attendance is mandatory, students should be able to
take advantage of their opportunity for an education free from
physical and psychological attacks. 215

205. Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 217 (“[The school district] could
argue that speech creating a ‘hostile environment’ may be banned because it ‘intrudes
upon . . . the rights of other students.’”) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969)).
206. Id.
207. Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243, 264 (3d Cir. 2002).
208. Id. at 264–65.
209. Id. at 274 (Rosenn, J., dissenting in part).
210. Id. at 275 (Rosenn, J., dissenting in part).
211. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. granted,
vacating as moot sub nom. Harper ex rel. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 549 U.S. 1262
(2007).
212. Id. at 1183 (“Although we, like the district court, rely on Tinker, we rely on a
different provision—that schools may prohibit speech that ‘intrudes upon . . . the rights of
other students.’”).
213. Id. at 1171. Poway High School allowed the student Gay-Straight Alliance to
organize a Day of Silence to “teach tolerance of others.” Id.
214. Id. at 1176.
215. Id. at 1178.
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C. Definitional Problems with the Rights of Others
A legitimate hesitation to using the “rights of others” prong is
the concern over the lack of a sufficiently narrow definition. 216
Courts and scholars have proposed two theories: (1) a right to be
free from torts, and (2) a right to be free from psychological harm.
Although the right to be free from torts is an attractive interpretation
because it is an easily definable bright-line rule, it adds no additional
protection to parents, students, or schools because it only allows
schools to regulate student speech that they can already regulate
under existing First Amendment doctrines. In contrast, a right to be
free from psychological harm, appropriately limited, not only offers
students a benefit in the speech rights trade-off, but also aligns with
the Supreme Court’s use of the Blackwell precedent and subsequent
circuit cases.
1. A right to be free from torts
Upon finding no disruption to the school under Tinker’s first
prong, the Eighth Circuit in Kuhlmeier applied Tinker’s second
prong and made one of the first explicit efforts to define the “rights
of others.” Although it noted the second prong analysis from
Trachtman, it was more persuaded by a student law review note on
school newspapers that stated “[l]imiting school action under the
invasion-of-rights justification to torts or potential torts means that a
school can refer to previously defined legal standards to decide if it
may constitutionally restrain student expression.” 217 The court
reasoned that “[a]ny yardstick less exacting than potential tort
liability could result in school officials curtailing speech at the
slightest fear of disturbance.” 218 This argument is unpersuasive
because the Supreme Court has since made it clear in both
Kuhlmeier and Morse that schools can curtail some student speech

216. Lee Goldman, Student Speech and the First Amendment: A Comprehensive Approach,
63 FLA. L. REV. 395, 421 (2011) (“Tinker’s interference with the rights of others prong might
eliminate all student First Amendment speech rights. After all, other students arguably have a
right not to be captive to unwanted speech.”).
217. Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1375–76 (8th Cir. 1986),
rev’d sub nom. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
218. Id. at 1376.

1671

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

1/30/2014 2:39 PM

2013

that does not meet Tinker’s substantial disruption prong, even if it
does not result in potential tort liability for the school. 219
The dissent in Harper adopted a similar position to the Eighth
Circuit, arguing that “[t]he ‘rights of others’ language in Tinker can
only refer to traditional rights, such as those against assault,
defamation, invasion of privacy, extortion and blackmail, whose
interplay with the First Amendment is well established.” 220 The
dissent feared that any broader definition would allow “the First
Amendment rights of students [to be defined] out of existence.” 221
As discussed below, a definition of the “rights of others” can be
crafted that both protects victims of cyberbullying and preserves First
Amendment rights for students.
A workable definition of the “rights of others” would not only
preserve First Amendment rights of students, but as part of the
ongoing school speech trade-off, would also provide additional
benefits to students. The “rights of others” definition to be free of
torts does not accomplish this. Schools can already, under Tinker or
other First Amendment precedent, restrict student speech that
threatens unlawful activity. 222 To say that “the rights of others”
means nothing more than to allow schools to regulate speech already
under their control makes the prong unnecessary.
2. Right to be free from psychological harm
Schools should be able to use “rights of others” prong to restrict
cyberbullying because restricting harmful student speech gives public
school students the benefit of being free from psychological harm, a
219. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (permitting regulation of
speech related to legitimate pedagogical interests); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007)
(permitting regulation of speech promoting illegal drug use).
220. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1198 (9th Cir. 2006), cert.
granted, vacating as moot sub nom. Harper ex rel. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 549
U.S. 1262 (2007) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
221. Id.
222. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (holding incitement to
imminent lawless behavior unprotected); Wisniewski ex rel. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494
F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[W]e think that [under Tinker] school officials have significantly
broader authority to sanction student speech [urging violent conduct] than the Watts standard
allows.”); D.C. v. R.R., 106 Cal. Rptr. 3d 399 (Ct. App. 2010) (determining that the violent
and threatening nature of cyberbullying was a “true threat” and not protected under the First
Amendment). See also Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 439 (2007) (Stevens, Souter &
Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting) (quoting Fraser and arguing “that our rigid imminence requirement
ought to be relaxed at schools”).
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benefit they would not have outside of the school setting. As
discussed below, a workable definition of the “rights of others”
distilled from case law includes the right to be free from
intimidation, humiliation, or harassment that is severe or pervasive.
An understanding of the historical context of Blackwell, where
the phrase “the rights of others” originates, suggests that one
meaning of the phrase was to allow students to be free from
intimidation. Given the setting of Blackwell—a voting rights protest
at an all-black segregated high school at the heart of racial violence
in Mississippi in 1965 223—students afraid of the repercussions of
wearing a button 224 likely felt intimidated by other students. The
enemy of the right to vote was not inside the high school, 225 but in
the community at large. 226 Therefore, the non-protesting students’
right to be let alone would include being free from the psychological
harm of intimidation resulting from the protestors’ coercive actions.
In Trachtman, the proposed student survey hoped to solicit
responses from students about “pre-marital sex, contraception,
homosexuality, masturbation and the extent of students’ ‘sexual
experience.’” 227 However, it was not designed to “guarantee the
anonymity of those who answered.” 228 Arguably, for both teens who
were sexually experienced and those who were not, the possibility
that such information could be individually identified and shared at
school likely would have caused humiliation resulting in

223. Bowman, supra note 42, at 1137–38. In addition to the murder of the three voting
rights volunteers near Philadelphia, Mississippi, the site of the Burnside case, Rolling Fork, the
site of the Blackwell case was also geographically sandwiched between two hotbeds of racial
violence: the city of McComb, where fifteen racially motivated bombings had recently
occurred, was 150 miles to the south, and Selma, Alabama was 300 miles to the north where,
the day after the students in Blackwell wore their buttons, Martin Luther King Jr. was arrested
with 300 other protestors because the town refused to register black voters. Id.
224. Id. at 1136 (suggesting that had the principal allowed the wearing of the buttons,
“the reaction from the African-American community probably would have been privately
mixed, but publicly quiet. And, the White community likely would have reacted with hostility
at best and violence visited upon the principal and his family at worst”).
225. Id. at 1140 (arguing that the principal likely attempted to prevent students from
wearing their buttons because they “faced potentially violent retaliation from the local White
community”).
226. Id. at 1134. The Council of Federated Organizations estimated that in retaliation
for the voting rights drive in Mississippi in 1964 there were over 1000 arrests, 65 burned or
bombed buildings, and at least 6 murders. Id.
227. Trachtman v. Anker , 563 F.2d 512, 515 (2d Cir. 1977).
228. Id.
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“considerable anxiety and tension.” 229 Students should be free from
humiliation at school that results from public sharing of information
that will hold them up to ridicule.
Like the Second Circuit in Trachtman, the Ninth Circuit in
Harper “unequivocally reject[ed]” the argument that the “rights of
others” only referred to the right to be free from physical
confrontation, 230 and defined “the rights of others” instead as
freedom from harassment. The majority argued that although namecalling is constitutionally protected outside of school, “students
cannot hide behind the First Amendment to protect their ‘right’ to
abuse and intimidate other students at school.” 231 Further, school
administrators need not “tolerate verbal assaults that may destroy the
self-esteem of . . . teenagers and interfere with their educational
development.” 232
In order to provide that the definition of the “rights of others”
does not sweep in otherwise protected speech, the severity or
pervasiveness of the intimidation, humiliation, or harassment should
be examined, as advocated in Saxe, 233 to determine if it rises to the
level of cyberbullying. Therefore, an effective test to determine if
Tinker’s “rights of others” has been violated would consist of two
steps: first, whether the speech involved intimidation, humiliation,
and harassment; and second, whether such behavior met a
“threshold showing of severity and pervasiveness.” 234 If the speech
qualifies under both steps, it is not protected. Under this definition,
the speech in J.S., Layshock, J.C., and Kowalski would not have been
protected since it was humiliating, harassing, and severe. In J.C. and
Kowalski, the speech was also clearly intimidating since neither girl
wanted to return to school as a result of the ridicule. This definition,
with its limiting threshold, would not open students up to discipline

229. Id. at 518.
230. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006), cert.
granted, vacating as moot sub nom. Harper ex rel. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 549
U.S. 1262 (2007) (acknowledging Harper’s interpretation of Blackwell where he concludes
that the accosting of other students was the only instance of a collision with the rights of
others).
231. Id. (quoting Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243, 264 (3d
Cir. 2002)).
232. Id. at 1179.
233. See supra notes 205–06 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 205–06 and accompanying text.
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for “simple acts of teasing or name-calling” or grant students an
“affirmative right not to be offended.” 235 Instead, it would give
school administrators, 236 guided by elected school boards, and
supported by parents, the tools and flexibility to end the
cyberbullying rip-off.
VI. CONCLUSION
Schools’ inability to address cyberbullying has created a rip-off
for schools and students where speech that otherwise could be
restricted as part of the public school trade-off 237 is allowed because
its covert nature defies Tinker’s substantial disruption test. Using the
“rights of others” standard from Tinker is more consistent with how
school speech precedent has evolved, the text from Tinker itself, and
subsequent Supreme Court and circuit cases. Schools should be able
to regulate cyberbullying when it invades the rights of other students
to be free from intimidation, humiliation, and harassment provided
the invasion is sufficiently severe and pervasive. This both preserves
the balance of the public school trade-off, and sends a message that,
“[t]here is no constitutional right to be a bully.” 238
Stacie A. Stewart*

235. Harper, 445 F.3d at 1198 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (quoting Davis v. Monroe
Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 652 (1999)).
236. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 n.9 (1985) (“The promulgation of a rule
forbidding specified conduct presumably reflects a judgment on the part of school officials that
such conduct is destructive of school order or of a proper educational environment. Absent any
suggestion that the rule violates some substantive constitutional guarantee, the courts should,
as a general matter, defer to that judgment and refrain from attempting to distinguish between
rules that are important to the preservation of order in the schools and rules that are not.”).
237. See Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist. 650 F.3d 205, 222 (3d Cir. 2011) (Jordan, J.,
concurring) (“[A]ny claimed right to spread scurrilous falsehoods about school administrators
may well be outweighed by society’s legitimate interest in the orderly administration of public
schools.”).
238. Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243, 264 (3d Cir. 2002).
*
J.D. Candidate, April 2014, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young
University. The author would like to thank Professors Sarah Brinton and Brigham Daniels for
their valuable feedback in the preparation of this Comment.
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